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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF GOD'S LAW: 
ISLAMIC MAHR CONTRACTS AND THE 
PERILS OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 
Nathan B. Oman* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the courts of New Jersey dissolved the marriage of the 
Chaudrys. 1 Hanif, the husband, was a successful physician in New 
Jersey. 2 Parveen, his wife, was a homemaker who returned to their 
native Pakistan with her children upon the dissolution of the 
marriage.3 Because they were Muslim, the Chaudrys signed a 
contract when they were married. 4 Indeed, for a Muslim marriage 
is a contract. 5 It is not possible to enter into a Muslim marriage 
without signing a contract. 6 Like all Islamic marriage contracts, the 
Chaudrys' agreement contained what is known as a deferred mahr, 
a sum of money-in this case $1500-that the husband promised to 
pay to the wife in the event of divorce. 7 Hanif claimed that this 
provision in their marriage contract constituted a premarital 
agreement in which Parveen had bargained away any future claims 
under American divorce law. 8 The New Jersey court accepted this 
* Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. This Article is part of 
a larger research project looking at the treatment of Islamic mahr agreements 
by American courts. In a longer subsequent article I hope to provide a more 
detailed discussion of the legal issues surrounding these contracts. Stay tuned. 
I wish to thank Robert Hillman and Brian Bix for extensive comments and 
criticism on an earlier draft of this Article. The faults that remain are mine 
alone. As always, I thank Heather. 
1. Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
2. Id. at 1002. 
3. Id. at 1004. 
4. Id. at 1003. 
5. W AEL B. liALLAQ, SHARI'A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 271 
(2009) (discussing the contractual basis behind marriage in Islam). 
6. See id. at 272 (noting that marriage in Islam depends on a indefinite 
contract). This is not literally true, as Islamic law allows marriage contracts to 
be concluded by proxies. See id. at 27 4 ("Either of the two contracting parties 
could be represented by a person acting on his/her behalf as a legally 
empowered agent."). This, however, simply serves to further emphasize the 
strongly contractual nature of marriage under Islamic law. 
7. See Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1003-04 (discussing the size of the deferred 
mahr); see also HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 277 (discussing the necessity of a mahr 
provision for a valid Islamic marriage contract). 
8. Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1002. 
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argument, denying Parveen any claim on the marital assets. 9 
Chaudry v. Chaudry is a vivid illustration of a broader issue. 
As the Muslim population of the United States increases, American 
courts increasingly must decide on the meaning of Islamic marriage 
contracts, particularly the much-litigated question of how to treat 
deferred mahr provisions. This Article uses the treatment of mahr 
provisions by the American courts to illustrate one of the perils of 
creating a specialized body of law. The common law of contracts has 
long been criticized for being too general and abstract, applying the 
same rules to parties regardless of their status or the nature of their 
agreement. 10 In response, lawmakers have carved out particular 
classes of transactions from the common law of contract, creating 
specialized bodies of law such as labor law, employment law, or the 
like. This is an understandable and, at times, laudable 
development. The creation of such specialized bodies of law, 
however, is not without its problems. In particular, lawmakers 
often overestimate their knowledge of the particularities of certain 
kinds of transactions or fail to foresee new or unexpected 
transactional forms. 11 When this happens, two sorts of problems can 
arise. 
The harsh result in Chaudry v. Chaudry illustrates the first 
problem posed by specialized bodies of law. The court in Chaudry 
almost certainly misinterpreted the meaning of the contract and the 
intentions of the parties. It made this error because it failed to 
understand the particular cultural and religious context that framed 
the Chaudrys' marriage contract and gave it meaning. The court 
assumed that the contract must be a premarital agreement, a 
contract bargaining away rights in divorce. The mahr provision in 
the Chaudrys' contract, however, was not intended to bargain away 
rights in divorce. Indeed, the requirement in Islamic law that a 
marriage contract contain a deferred mahr predates the existence of 
the common law-to say nothing of the United States-by centuries 
and was developed to solve a different set of social concerns than 
those presented by the ordinary premarital agreement. 12 No 
9. See id. at 1006 (noting that the marriage did not have any adequate 
nexus to New Jersey for the court to rule in the wife's favor). 
10. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 
GEO. L.J. 77, 79-86 (2009) (summarizing the critiques of general contract law); 
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618-19 (2003) (noting that current contract law applies 
to parties of all types and arguing that contract law should be narrower and 
more deferential to contracting parties). 
11. See, e.g., infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (noting the 
oversimplification attendant to the Uniform Commercial Code's approach to the 
"battle of the forms"). 
12. See JAMAL J.A. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAw AND 
MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 33-34 (3d ed. 2009) ("The dower (mahr) is 
another right of the wife .... [T]he dower is a sum of money or other property 
which becomes payable to a man's wife simply as an effect of marriage .... [I]t 
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approach to contract law can eliminate the risk of misconstruing the 
meaning of parties' agreements. Courts will always be called on to 
interpret the meaning of contracts, and such interpretation always 
carries with it the danger of misunderstanding meaning because of 
ignorance of the context in which the contract was made. It is 
possible, however, that the New Jersey court assumed that the 
Chaudrys were bargaining over their default rights in divorce when 
they signed their marriage contract because, in the United States, 
we have created a specialized body of contract law-the law of 
premarital agreements-structured around the assumption that 
such rights are what contracts made in contemplation of marriage 
are about. 13 The strong assumptions that this specialized body of 
law makes about the content of contracts can lure courts into 
ignoring context because the law already purports to inform them of 
what is "really" going into particular kinds of contracts. 
Legal specialization creates another problem that is also on 
display in American courts' treatment of Islamic marriage contracts. 
The law of premarital agreements has developed a set of specialized 
rules that are designed to closely fit a particular cultural script 
about marriage and the presumed problems of contracts made on 
the threshold of matrimony. Embedded in the law of premarital 
agreements is a story about marriage. Accordingly, this body of law 
creates special defenses that can be raised to contractual liability, 
defenses that are designed to protect parties from the particular 
pathologies assumed to lurk in the "typical" premarital agreement. 
Because they occur in a different cultural context, however, mahr 
contracts do not raise the concerns that motivate the law of 
premarital agreements. Hence, the Uniform Premarital Agreements 
Act ("UP AA") creates requirements that are meant to act as a 
prophylaxis against inconsiderately bargaining away one's rights in 
divorce. 14 Mahr contracts, by contrast, are not about bargaining 
away such rights. Nevertheless, in litigation, parties to mahr 
contracts can invoke the requirements of the law of premarital 
agreements to escape liability. In the context of Islamic marriage 
contracts, however, these special defenses cease to serve a purpose. 
Rather, they simply add to the complexity of the law, providing 
parties with a defense against liability in situations in which we 
have no reason to suppose that imposing liability is problematic. In 
short, when reality diverges from the narrative assumed by the law, 
specialized rules can become traps for the unwary, and can become 
meaningless technicalities to be exploited by the opportunistic. 
is a token of the affection, esteem and respect that the man feels for the woman 
he is about to marry."); id. at 87-104 (explaining the mahr). 
13. See JOHN DE WriT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAw 99-100 
(3d ed. 2005) (noting that marital agreements are often used to privately order 
marriage and divorce). 
14. See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001). 
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This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I argue that creating 
specialized bodies of law increases the danger of promulgating rules 
that diverge from transactional reality. In Part II, I illustrate these 
problems in the context of Islamic marriage contracts, explaining 
the religious context in which they arise and the way in which the 
law of premarital obligations can be perversely applied to them. 
Finally, in Part III, I argue that the general law of contracts, rather 
than the supposedly more nuanced law of premarital agreements, 
allows judges to reach defensible results in litigation over mahr 
contracts. 
I. THE PERILS OF SPECIALIZATION 
Much of contract doctrine is pitched at a very high level of 
generality. The common law of contracts, for example, purports to 
apply to all "persons," regardless of whether they are actual human 
beings or corporations. 15 Likewise, many rules, such as those 
involving offer, acceptance, consideration, and the like, purportedly 
apply equally to a contract over the sale of a cow and to a contract 
over the sale of a multibillion dollar international oil company. 16 
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, new bodies of 
law have been created to govern particular kinds of transactions. 
Hence, we have the law of the sale of goods codified in Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), the rise of labor law, and 
the proliferation of law at both the state and federal level governing 
employment contracts. 17 The proliferation of these specialized 
bodies of transaction-specific law can be traced in part to a critique 
of the common law of contract's drive toward generality and 
abstraction. 18 
15. See Daniel A Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, 
in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 
54 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (noting that the common law 
creates precedential rules); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 548 (recognizing 
that the mandatory rules of the common law of contracts apply to both 
individuals and corporations alike). 
16. Compare Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 921-22 (Mich. 1887) 
(contract for sale of cow), with Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 
788-96 (Tex. App. 1987) (contract for sale of oil company). 
17. See generally ANDREA BLOOM, LENDER LIABILITY: PRACTICE AND 
PREVENTION (1989) (discussing the special laws applying to loan contracts); 
MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (6th 
ed. 2007) (providing a summary of American labor law); MARK A ROTHSTEIN & 
LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2007) 
(summarizing American employment law); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (5th ed. 2000) (discussing the Uniform 
Commercial Code); MARGARET WILKIE ET AL., LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW 
(Marise Cremona ed., 5th ed. 2006) (summarizing American landlord-tenant 
law). 
18. See Oman, supra note 10, at 79-86 (discussing the critique of general 
contract law); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 
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In the traditional telling, the movement toward generality and 
abstraction in classical contract doctrine is the lingering remnant of 
a discredited set of late-nineteenth-century assumptions about the 
nature oflaw. In this story, Christopher Columbus Langdell and his 
minions are cast as the villains, seeking to create a "scientific" body 
of contract law devoted to formal consistency and abstract 
intellectual elegance without responding to the practical vagaries of 
real transactions. 19 When Holmes called Langdell "the greatest 
living legal theologian," it was not meant as a compliment. 20 
Rather, "theologian" was offered as a term of intellectual abuse, 
suggesting that Langdell had disregarded social realities in favor of 
ethereal abstractions that, like the mythical angels of the 
scholastics, danced on the heads of pins but offered scant guidance 
to the practical work of the law. 21 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the normative basis for contract 
law's generality is less incoherent than critics have suggested and 
that generality serves important pragmatic goals. 22 In particular, I 
have claimed that contractual generality serves as a prophylaxis 
against capture by special interest groups. 23 Like the extended 
republic of James Madison's Federalist Number 10,24 a general law 
of contract is more difficult for any particular faction to rig for its 
own benefit. 25 The generality of contract law also promotes 
22 CONN. L. REV. 437, 439-48 (1990) (recognizing the erosion of contract 
abstraction). 
19. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1 (1983) (offering an influential interpretation of Langdell's legal thoughts in 
the context of intellectual trends during the Gilded Age); Bruce A. Kimball, The 
Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 
LAw & HIST. REV. 277 (2004) (summarizing historical work on Langdell). More 
recent historical scholarship has tended to soften the indictment against 
Langdell and other architects of classical contract doctrine. See generally, e.g., 
Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the 
Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAw & HIST. REV. 345 (2007); Mark L. Movsesian, 
Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2004) (offering an account 
of Samuel Williston that questions the characterization of him and of classical 
contract doctrine as overly formalistic and abstract). 
20. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 
(1880). 
21. See id. 
22. See Oman, supra note 10, at 86-105 (setting forth practical purposes 
served by contract law's generality). See generally Nathan B. Oman, 
Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex 
Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101 (2005) (arguing that contrary to claims 
made by some critics, autonomy theories of contract do not provide reasons for 
separating contracts by corporations from contracts by natural persons). 
23. Oman, supra note 10, at 90 ("The more general the application of a body 
of law, however, the less likely it is to be subject to such capture by special 
interests."). 
24. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
25. See Oman, supra note 10, at 91-94 (describing the decreased incentives 
special interests have in investing to capture general contract law). 
584 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
innovation in transactional structure by remaining largely agnostic 
about how parties should order their contracts. 26 This, in turn, 
allows for a diffused process of trial and error by which parties using 
differing transactional structures can find solutions to their 
collective problems. 27 
If generality has unappreciated virtues, legal specialization-
the process of creating transaction-specific bodies of law-also has 
its own vices. Any kind of contract law will necessarily rest on 
either implicit or explicit assumptions about the shape of typical 
transactions. Another way of putting this point is that behind every 
legal rule there is a narrative. This narrative tells the story of a 
deal, of how it could go wrong (or right), and how the law should 
deal with it. Hence, one of the important questions in assessing any 
rule is whether the narrative on which it rests corresponds to 
reality, or at least corresponds frequently enough for the rule to be 
serviceable. The fact that the law makes narrative assumptions is, 
of course, true whether the law in question consists of the highly 
abstract rules of classical contract doctrine or the specialized rules 
of transaction-specific bodies of law. Indeed, one of the persistent 
critiques of general contract law is that its implicit narrative of 
equal bargaining is false, a point pithily captured in James Gordon's 
summary of the curriculum of a first year contracts class: 
"Contracts. Study rules based on a model of two-fisted negotiators 
with equal bargaining power who dicker freely, voluntarily agree on 
all terms, and reduce their understanding to a writing intended to 
embody their full agreement. Learn that the last contract fitting 
this model was signed in 1879."28 
The divergence of the law's narrative from reality, however, 
becomes particularly acute when dealing with specialized bodies of 
contract law precisely because such rules aim to capture 
transactional structure at a much finer level of granularity. 
Accordingly, there are more ways in which legal rules can fall prey 
to reality. Consider section 2-207 of the U.C.C. 29 This section is 
drafted around a very specific narrative about the so-called "battle of 
the forms."30 The battle arises when parties engage in negotiations 
by exchanging preprinted forms. 31 Under the common law, no 
contract is formed until the offeree proffers an acceptance that 
26. See id. at 103 ("Allowing the widest possible innovation in transactional 
forms responds to these concerns by allowing the disaggregated process of 
experimentation with contracts in particular situations to gradually evolve 
toward effective solutions to a myriad of collective problems."). 
27. See id. at 104 (noting that general contract law allows much more 
innovation than specialized bodies oflaw). 
28. James D. Gordon III, How Not To Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 
1679, 1696 (1991). 
29. u.c.c. § 2-207 (2003). 
30. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 1-3, at 29-48. 
31. Id. at 29-30. 
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exactly matches the terms of the offeror. 32 The drafters of 2-207 
imagined that the technicality of this rule allowed some parties to 
escape contractual obligations to which they ought to be held. 33 In 
the paradigmatic case, Buyer orders goods from Seller using a 
preprinted order form. Seller agrees to supply the goods by replying 
with a preprinted invoice. Buyer then changes his mind and seeks 
to escape his obligations to Seller by noting the difference between 
Seller's invoice and Buyer's order form. Buyer's offer was never 
accepted by Seller and under the mirror image rule no contract was 
ever formed! 34 To the drafters of 2-207, this result was perverse, 
injecting uncertainty into the validity of unobjectionable agreements 
through the application of a technical rule to texts that no one reads 
and on which no one relies. 35 Accordingly, 2-207 jettisons the mirror 
image rule, stating instead that "[a] definite and seasonable 
expression of acceptance ... operates as an acceptance even though 
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed 
upon .... "36 Problem solved. 
The drafters of 2-207, however, assumed a much greater 
familiarity with commercial practice than they in fact possessed. 37 
In fact, very few parties get caught in the snares of the mirror image 
rule so as to allow their counterparties to escape from otherwise 
unobjectionable agreements. 33 Indeed, the narrative of competing 
forms assumed by 2-207 has proved dangerously simplistic. In 
contrast to the simple exchange of forms with differing terms, the 
cases reveal a much more variegated world. One survey of reported 
decisions showed "cases where there were three documents, a 
solicitation, a purchase order, and an acknowledgement; where one 
party signed the other's documents; and where a party's behavior 
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1981) (setting forth the 
mirror image rule). 
33. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 30. 
34. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 623 
(N.Y. 1915) (holding that no contract between the parties had been formed 
because of minor differences between the offer and the putative acceptance). 
35. See WmTE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 30 ("The original drafter of 2-
207 designed it mostly to keep the welsher in the contract."); James J. White, 
Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 32-33 
("[Section 2-207] appears to have been drafted for two types of transactions. 
First, it was meant to reverse the outcome in cases like Poel v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co. . . . . Second, it was intended to protect an oral agreement 
from surprise alterations when one or both parties send 'confirming' forms 
containing terms additional to or different from those already agreed upon."); 
see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 
39 V AND. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (1986). 
36. u.c.c. § 2-207(1) (2003). 
37. White, supra note 35, at 33 (stating that the drafters of 2-207 "grossly 
overestimated their knowledge ofthe underlying transactions"). 
38. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the 
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1233-36 
(1982). 
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appeared to indicate assent to materially different terms in the 
other's responsive form." 39 Rather than protecting expectations by 
ensuring that a party could not weasel out of contractual liability on 
a technicality, the rule has injected uncertainty into the contracting 
process by allowing parties to litigate endlessly about which of the 
terms in the various conflicting writings control. In short, section 2-
207 displays the confusion and difficulties that result when the 
narrative implicit in a transaction-specific rule diverges from actual 
t . 40 prac 1ce. 
This Article, fortunately, is not the place to sort out the best 
approach for dealing with the chaos that section 2-207 has wrought. 
Rather, I bring up the section because it provides a familiar 
illustration of a more general set of problems. The drafting of 
transaction-specific rules will necessarily involve lawmakers in 
assumptions about the standard shape of the underlying 
transaction. The more detailed the transaction-specific rule 
becomes, the stronger those assumptions will necessarily be. This 
creates two problems. The first is that in mastering a specialized 
body of law judges come to internalize the narrative implicitly 
assumed by that law. This can lead them to mischaracterize 
transactions and even misapply the law. For example, in ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, the pull of the underlying narrative of the battle of the 
forms led an otherwise well-informed and sophisticated judge to 
erroneously conclude that 2-207 does not apply to the formation and 
interpretation of contracts where no forms are exchanged, even 
though the language of the section clearly contains no such 
limitation. 41 My claim is not that specialized bodies of law require 
judges to misinterpret contracts. Rather, I am making the more 
modest claim that specialized bodies of law embed in judges' minds a 
particular script about transactions, and once this script is 
entrenched, it may be difficult for judges to recognize and apply the 
law to fact patterns that diverge from it. 
The second problem is that specialized bodies of law provide 
parties with defenses and other doctrinal tools based on a particular 
set of assumptions about the problems to which their transaction is 
prone. When the transactions that the rules are called on to govern 
deviate significantly from the script that the rules implicitly 
assume, however, these doctrines cease to serve their original 
purpose. Rather, they simply add to the complexity of legal 
arguments. This creates the danger of turning litigation into a 
lottery, with winners and losers being chosen through the 
39. White, supra note 35, at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
40. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 30 (stating that section 2-207 
"is like an amphibious tank that was originally designed to fight in the swamps, 
but was sent to fight in the desert"). 
41. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Easterbrook, J.) ("Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant."). 
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application of rules that serve little functional purpose in the 
litigants' context. Less worryingly, it adds to the burden and 
complexity of litigation, a fact testified to by the continual tide of 
cases over section 2-207.42 At best, courts will be forced to offer 
strained interpretations of the transaction-specific rule in order to 
reach sensible outcomes. 43 At worst, parties will be able to escape 
liability in situations in which we have no reason to suppose that 
imposing liability is problematic. 
It is possible, of course, to overstate the dichotomy between 
specialized bodies of contract law and the general law of contracts. 
Discussing issues in terms of these two poles is useful because it 
allows us to sharpen our sense of the problems that our approach to 
the law can create. The reality, however, is always messier than 
any neat dichotomy suggests. The common law of contracts, for 
example, always contained specialized, transaction-specific 
doctrines. 44 Likewise, specialized statutes governing particular 
transactions never wholly displace the general law of contracts. 
Rather, even when such laws displace particular doctrines or rules, 
the background law of contracts always stands ready to answer 
questions in areas in which specialized bodies of law are silent. 45 In 
practice this means that when litigating and deciding cases, lawyers 
and judges move seamlessly from arguments based on general 
principles of contract to arguments based on transaction-specific 
rules without noting or even being aware of any distinction between 
them. 
That said, both of the problems discussed above are on display 
in the application of a specialized body of contract law-in this case 
the law of premarital agreements-to Islamic marriage contracts. 
Rather than conforming to the culturally specific script envisioned 
by the law of premarital agreements, Islamic marriage contracts 
operate in a very different context, one in which the transactional 
42. See White, supra note 35, at 34-35 (noting that section 2-207 has 
provoked substantial litigation). 
43. See id. at 37 ("Worse, [a particular case under section 2-207] exhibits 
exactly the kind of statute-torturing that Llewellyn and the other realists most 
despised. To think that the realist's own statute has reduced a smart judge to 
such dishonest behavior would embarrass Llewellyn's ghost."). 
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 28 (1981) (offers in 
auctions); id. § 64 (rule regarding acceptance by telephone); id. § 82(2)(c) 
(promise to perform a contract unenforceable under the statute of limitations); 
id. § 83 (promise to perform a contract discharged in bankruptcy); id. § 87 
(option contracts); id. § 88 (guaranty contracts); id. § 313 (third-party 
beneficiaries and government contracts). 
45. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103 (2003) (stating that principles oflaw and equity 
with regard to contracts continue to govern agreements for the sale of goods 
unless specifically displaced by the U.C.C.). The importance of common law and 
equity under the U.C.C. is testified to by the existence of a treatise devoted to 
the subject. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAw AND EQUITY 
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1985). 
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assumptions of the law of premarital obligations prove misleading. 
II. MAHR CONTRACTS 
In order to understand the problems that legal specialization 
has created in the enforcement of Islamic marriage contracts, it is 
necessary to understand the context in which such contracts arise. 
In particular, their meanings as well as the practices surrounding 
them have their origins in Muslim religious law. Accordingly, before 
looking at the American case law, it is necessary to provide a brief 
introduction to the Islamic law of marriage and divorce. 
A. The Islamic Law of Marriage and Divorce 
Islamic law has its origins in the life of the Prophet 
Muhammed. In 610 C.E., Muhammed, then a successful merchant 
in the city of Mecca, heard the voice of the angel Gabriel in the 
desert commanding him to "Recite!"46 The results were the first 
suras (chapters) of what became the Qua'ran and eventually the 
founding of a new monotheistic faith. 47 Unlike Jesus, who was 
never an overtly civic leader, 46 the religion that Muhammed 
promulgated was necessarily political. Perhaps the key moment in 
the ministry of Muhammed came in 622 C.E., when he left Mecca 
and migrated in the so-called Hijra to the city of Yathrib, also 
known as Medina. 49 There Muhammed became not only a spiritual 
but also a civic and military leader. 50 The portions of the Qua'ran 
received by Muhammed in this period, unlike those received during 
the so-called Meccan period, frequently dealt with matters of civic 
administration-in short, with matters oflaw. 51 Law is thus deeply 
woven into the sacred texts and founding myths of Islam. 52 For a 
Muslim, following Muhammed's example as a pious adherent of 
Islam necessarily means trying to emulate his effort to realize God's 
46. See DANIEL C. PETERSON, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET OF GoD 51 (2d ed. 2007). 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 92-93 (observing that Jesus held no political office). But see 
generally JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY BIOGRAPHY (1994) 
(arguing that Jesus should be seen as the leader of a political protest 
movement); JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, THE HISTORICAL JESUS: THE LIFE OF A 
MEDITERRANEAN JEWISH PEASANT (1991) (same). 
49. See PETERSON, supra note 46, at 91 ("For the move of Muhammad from 
Mecca to his new home placed Islam and its message, as well as the Prophet 
himself, on an entirely new plane."). 
50. ld. ("Muhammad became a prophet-statesman, the founder of a 
political order and eventually of an empire that would change the history of the 
world."). 
51. See id. at 93 ("The ideal Islamic paradigm, however, is Muhammad, 
who ruled a state for nearly half his prophetic ministry and received numerous 
revelations instructing him how to do it."). 
52. The word "myth" is not used here in the pejorative sense of a false 
story, but to denote a profound story meant to provide meaning to the world. 
2010] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF GOD'S LAW 589 
justice in the world. Later generations of Muslims built on the 
Medinan passages of the Qua'ran and the stories recounting the 
actions and teachings of the Prophet, known as sunna or hadith, to 
create an elaborate system of religious law. This system is known 
as the shari'a or fiqh. 53 Among the issues that the fiqh treats in 
great detail are matters of marriage and divorce. 
In Islam, marriage is a contract, not a sacrament. 54 Indeed, 
there is no notion of priesthood or of a priestly class in Islam and 
hence no sacramental or liturgical rules. 55 In order for a marriage to 
be formed, the prospective husband and wife must consent to their 
union in a written contract. 56 In the case of a "virgin"-a woman 
who has not been previously married-the marriage negotiations 
are conducted by a wali, generally her closest male relative. 57 The 
purpose of the wali is to safeguard the interests of the prospective 
wife in the marriage negotiations. 58 The husband must also confer 
on the wife a dower known as a mahr or saddaq. 59 Contrary to how 
it has been characterized by some, the mahr is not a "bride price."60 
53. Shari'a and fiqh have slightly different connotations. Shari'a refers to 
the primal way in which man ought to relate to God. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & 
Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 135, 141 (2002). One can think of the shari' a as 
the juridical expression of God's will for man. It is thus always in some sense 
transcendent and imperfectly grasped by human minds. Fiqh, in contrast, 
refers not to the transcendent law of God per se, but rather to the body of 
human interpretation of the divine revelation. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 3; 
Lino J. Lauro & Peter A. Samuelson, Toward Pluralism in Sudan: A 
Traditionalist Approach, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 65, 109 n.260 (1996). The purpose 
of the fiqh is to grasp the shari' a, to put it into practice but as an effort of the 
human mind; fiqh is in theory contingent and fallible in way that shari'a is not. 
See Asifa Quaraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi 
Helps Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
339,342. 
54. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 271 (discussing the contractual nature of 
marriage in Islam). 
55. There is a strong tradition of Muslim clerics, or ulama. See Dale F. 
Eickelman & James Piscatori, Foreward to MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE 
ULAMA IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF CHANGE, at ix, ix-x (2002). 
These clerics, however, are either scholars or preachers. See id. They enjoy no 
special sacerdotal authority in the way that Catholic or Orthodox clergy do. See 
id. 
56. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 271 ("[M]arriage as nikah [is] a contract 
with a narrow scope."). 
57. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 49-52 (outlining the two forms of 
guardianship recognized in shari'a law: one that has a right of compulsion 
exercised over minors or others with limited legal capacity and one that does 
not have this right of compulsion but instead is chosen in deference to social 
custom). 
58. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 27 4--76 (describing the role of the wali in 
negotiating the marriage contract). 
59. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 87-88 (discussing how dower is treated as 
part ofthe marriage contract). 
60. See id. at 87. 
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Rather, it is meant to ensure that a woman begins her marriage 
with some measure of financial independence. 61 Under the classical 
fiqh, a marriage contract is not valid without a mahr. 62 In practice, 
the mahr is always divided into an immediate gift of property-in 
modern Muslim marriages this can take the form of anything from a 
wedding ring to a substantial pool of personal property such as an 
apartment, a car, or furniture-and a deferred sum of money to be 
paid on either the death of the husband or the couple's divorce. 63 
There is no analogy under Islamic law to the common law idea 
of coverture. A Muslim woman does not lose her legal identity upon 
marriage. 64 Likewise, there is nothing in Islamic law analogous to 
community or marital property. 65 Any assets brought to the 
marriage by either party remain the individual property of that 
person. 66 Property acquired durin~ marriage remains the sole 
property of the person acquiring it. 7 Upon divorce, Islamic law 
provides nothing similar to the equitable distribution of marital 
property. 68 Rather, each spouse walks away from the marriage with 
his or her individual property. 69 Because there are frequently strong 
moral and social pressures against Muslim women working outside 
the home after marriage, 70 however, in practice this often means 
that a divorced wife is left with little or no claim on the collective 
wealth of the couple. The most dramatic exception to this is the 
deferred mahr. Absent the wife's consent, the husband's obligation 
to pay the deferred mahr promised upon divorce is virtually 
61. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 277 ("Immediate dower, paid upon 
conclusion of the contract, remained the wife's property throughout the 
marriage, and she was not obliged to spend it on anything or anyone other than 
herself .... "). 
62. See id. ("The dower may not be stipulated in the marriage contract, 'nor 
is it the point of marriage,' but both theory and practice requireD that it be 
paid."). 
63. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 90-91 (noting the practices relating to the 
mahr). 
64. See IiALLAQ, supra note 5, at 279 ("But the wife, like her husband, 
maintains an independent financial status throughout the marriage."). 
65. !d. ("Marriage does not create community property."). 
66. Id. ("Any inheritance or gift she may receive before or during the 
marriage remains hers exclusively, and so does her dower and all property that 
accrues to her."). 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *4-6 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) (rejecting husband's claim that the mahr 
provision barred the court from awarding equitable distribution of marital 
assets). 
69. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 279. 
70. See Nagat el-Sanabary, Women and the Nursing Profession in Saudi 
Arbia, in ARAB WOMEN: BETWEEN DEFIANCE AND RESTRAINT 71, 75-77 (Suha 
Sabbagh ed., 2003) (describing the social and moral stigma often associated 
with women working outside of the home). 
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absolute. 71 The mahr is not treated as a distribution of marital 
assets. 72 Rather, it is a debt owed by the husband to the wife. 73 
Indeed, the husband owes the debt even if the couple has no assets. 74 
In Iran, for example, a husband who fails to pay a deferred mahr 
upon divorce will be jailed. 75 
Under Islamic law divorce may take several forms. If a woman 
wishes to divorce her husband she has two options. First, she may 
seek what is known as a tafriq. 76 This is essentially divorce for 
cause. It must be granted by a religious judge-a qadi-and is 
generally only available in cases of abuse or abandonment. 77 If the 
woman is successful in obtaining a tafriq the marriage is dissolved 
and the husband is obligated to pay her the deferred mahr in their 
marriage contract. 78 The second method is known as a khul'. 79 This 
is a divorce by mutual consent. It does not require any showing of 
cause or the intervention of a qadi. 80 However, it does require the 
husband's consent. 81 Furthermore, in order to be valid, a khul< must 
be supported by consideration that passes from the wife to the 
husband. 82 As a practical matter, this consideration virtually 
always consists of the wife relinquishing her claim to the deferred 
71. See id. at 277 ("The delayed dower was normally stipulated as 
protection, becoming due to the wife from the husband if he repudiated her 
through talaq or if either of them died."). 
72. See JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAw OF PERSONAL STATUS 89 (2d ed. 
1990) ("The dower ... shall be the right of the wife once the valid contract is 
made."). 
73. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 88. 
74. See id. at 90-91 (describing how a wife can enforce the mahr as a debt 
owed to her by her spouse). 
75. Lindsey E. Blenkhom, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American 
Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on 
Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 201 (2002). 
76. See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 279-80 (discussing the requirements and 
function of tafriq ). 
77. Iranian To Pay 124,000-Rose Dowry, BBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle_east/7275506.stm; see also JUDITH E. TuCKER, 
IN THE HOUSE OF THE LAW: GENDER AND ISLAMIC LAw IN 0TIOMAN SYRIA AND 
PALESTINE 92 (1988) (documenting the practice of jailing a husband for failure 
to pay the mahr upon divorce). 
78. See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 280 (noting that "a judicial order known as 
tafriq" is literally translated in Arabic to mean "to separate the spouses from 
each other"). 
79. See id. at 283-86 (discussing the application of khul). 
80. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 129 ("[M]arriage may be dissolved by the 
wife literally paying her husband for her freedom under the Qur'anic ruling."). 
81. See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 284 ("Khul' is an offer made to the 
husband by the wife in respect of marital dissolution . . . . If the husband 
accepts the offer, he will then repudiate his wife once, considered to be an 
irrevocable utterance (ba'in)."). 
82. See id. at 285-86 (discussing the five required elements of a khul' 
contract, including consideration). 
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mahr in the marriage contract. 83 
In contrast to a woman's options, a husband may unilaterally 
divorce his wife through a mechanism known as talaq. 84 The 
husband's power of talaq is essentially unlimited. There is no 
requirement to show cause, nor is there any intervention by a qadi. 85 
However, upon talaq, the husband must pay the wife her deferred 
mahr. 86 Indeed, one of the reasons that the custom of a deferred 
mahr developed was to limit the husband's power oftalaq. 87 Women 
have no power analogous to talaq; their divorce options are limited 
to tafriq or khul'. A husband's power of talaq, however, may be 
delegated to another party by contract, 88 and some Muslim feminists 
have advocated marriage contracts in which the husband delegates 
the power of talaq to his wife, in effect equalizing spousal access to 
unilateral divorce. 89 While such a provision would be 
unobjectionable under most interpretations of Islamic law, it is not a 
common feature of most Muslim marriage contracts. 90 
With the exception of a few jurisdictions, such as Saudi Arabia, 
the classical fiqh is not the municipal law of most Islamic 
countries. 91 It has, however, exercised a profound influence on the 
formally enacted law of many nations with large Muslim 
populations. 92 Hence the law of marriage in a country such as 
Jordan or Pakistan follows the broad outlines of traditional Islamic 
law. 93 Marriage is formed by a contract between the husband and 
the wife or, more commonly, between a husband and the wife's 
83. See id. at 280 (noting the amount of consideration required for khul' 
will not exceed the amount of the dower). 
84. See id. at 280-83 (outlining the requirements and procedure oftalaq). 
85. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 282 (stating that in talaq, men are "not so 
queried as to their motives"). But see NASIR, supra note 12, at 120-29 
(discussing talaq and noting that many countries have begun to curb this nearly 
unlimited power of the husband). 
86. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 282 (noting that husbands "stood to lose 
most from marital dissolution" by exercising talaq). 
87. See Blenkhom, supra note 75, at 202 (equating the deferred mahr to a 
security deposit against talaq ). 
88. See liALLAQ, supra note 5, at 282 ("A husband can repudiate his wife by 
proxy, a right that he can delegate to the wife herself, enabling her to dissolve 
her marriage on his behalf."). 
89. See Kathleen A. Portuan Miller, Who Says Muslim Women Don't Have 
the Right To Divorce?-A Comparison Between Anglo·American Law and 
Islamic Law, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 201, 225-26 (2009) (discussing how marriage 
contracts may be used to enhance a woman's access to divorce). 
90. See Blenkhom, supra note 75, at 202 (noting the rarity in Islamic 
marriage contracts of allowing the wife to initiate divorce). 
91. JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAw IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: 
TENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 8--9 (2008). 
92. See generally OTTO, supra note 91 (describing the influence of Islamic 
law in Muslim countries). 
93. See id. at 76--104 (discussing Jordanian marriage law in relation to 
Islamic law). 
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wali. 94 The marriage contract will be required to contain a mahr 
provision to be valid. 95 The law of divorce and the distribution of a 
couple's assets will likewise closely follow the rules of the classical 
fiqh. 96 Some countries with large Muslim minorities-such as Israel 
and India-have created a parallel family court system for Muslims 
in which judges apply Islamic law, even if such law is not applied 
generally or to the marriages of non-Muslims. 97 In addition, 
religious Muslims living in non-Muslim societies-such as Muslim 
immigrants in Europe or the United States-often conform to the 
requirements of the fiqh as a matter of piety in contracting their 
marriages. 98 Accordingly, when Muslim marriages in the United 
States end in divorce, American courts often face the question of 
how to treat Islamic marriage contracts. 99 
B. Mahr Contracts in American Courts 
The overwhelming majority of these cases deal with the effect of 
the mahr provision on the distribution of marital property under 
American divorce statutes. Litigation over these contracts often 
becomes complex, especially when the marriage was entered into 
overseas and the court must deal with difficult questions of the 
applicable law under principles of international comity. 100 In 
addition, because Islamic marriage contracts are religious 
agreements, objections to their enforcement have been raised under 
94. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
96. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 76-104 (discussing the intersection of 
Islamic law and the law of Arabian countries). 
97. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human 
Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 109, 120 (2000). 
98. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490-91 (Md. 2008) 
(adjudicating a dispute over an Islamic marriage contract); Tarikonda v. 
Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) 
(same). 
99. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 864-65 (Ct. 
App. 2001); In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 871 (Ct. App. 1988); 
Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247--48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Aleem, 
947 A.2d at 490-91; Aleem v. Aleem, 931 A.2d 1123, 1124-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2007); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 94-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2002); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1002-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1978); Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. July 10, 1995); Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985); 
Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07-AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 10, 2008); Mir v. Bi:rjandi, Nos. 2006 CA 63, 2006 CA 71, 2006 CA 72, 2007 
WL 4170868, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007); Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-00-
1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001); Ahmed v. 
Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 192-94 (Tex. App. 2008). 
100. See, e.g., Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1003-04 (discussing the application of 
Pakistani law to the couple's marriage contract); Birjandi, 2007 WL 4170868, at 
*1 (discussing the effect of legal proceedings in Iran under the marriage 
contract on divorce proceedings in the United States). 
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both the First Amendment and state constitutional equivalents. 101 
Such issues are beyond the scope of this Article, but I flag them 
because they explain why courts' discussions of the pure contract 
issues in these cases are frequently short and confused by other 
legal theories. As a matter of contract, both husbands and wives 
invoke the mahr provision, albeit in different factual circumstances. 
In divorces in which there are substantial marital assets subject to 
potential distribution, husbands invoke the mahr provision in the 
hope of obtaining the bulk of the marital property. In Ahmad v. 
Ahmad, 102 for example, a Jordanian student in Ohio married a 
woman in Jordan that he met through a courtship arranged by the 
couple's families. 103 On returning to the United States, the marriage 
deteriorated, and the wife instituted divorce proceedings in Ohio. 104 
Over the course of the marriage, the couple acquired real estate in 
Ohio, which became the subject of litigation in the divorce. 105 The 
husband invoked the mahr contract signed in the course of the 
couple's marriage in Jordan, insisting that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to distribute the Ohio property because "the parties had 
previously entered into a contract delegating their rights and 
responsibilities upon divorce." 106 
Wives, in contrast, invoke the mahr provision in cases in which 
there are relatively few marital assets on which they could make a 
claim under American divorce statutes. In these cases, they claim 
that regardless of the equitable distribution of the marital estate, 
they are entitled to the amount of money promised them in the 
mahr contract. Another Ohio case, Zawahiri v. Alwattar, 107 provides 
an example. A medical student and a college student met through 
their families and subsequently were married under Ohio law. 108 
The students and their families, however, were observant Muslims 
and the marriage contract contained a deferred mahr of $25,000. 109 
101. See, e.g., Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 95 (discussing husband's argument that 
the enforcement of the mahr provision would violate the First Amendment); 
Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1 (discussing husband's argument that the 
enforcement of the mahr provision would violate the Ohio constitution's religion 
clauses). 
102. No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001). 
103. See id. at *2-3 (describing the events leading up to their marriage). 
104. Id. at *2 (noting that the husband had already obtained a divorce in 
Jordan before the wife filed in the Ohio courts). 
105. Id. at *3 (finding that the property at issue included the couple's 
residence and a block of apartments). 
106. ld. at *1 (listing the husband's points of error). 
107. No. 07-AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008). 
108. Id. at *1 ("Alwattar and Zawahiri courted for a month before she 
accepted his proposal."). 
109. Id. ("Ultimately, Zawahiri and the bride's father settled on $25,000 for 
the 'postponed' portion of the mahr. They also agreed that the 'advanced' 
portion of the mahr would consist of a ring and gold that Zawahiri and his 
family had already given Alwattar. "). 
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According to the court, "Unfortunately, the parties' marriage quickly 
foundered. They never lived together and, instead, remained in 
their respective parents' homes while Zawahiri studied for his 
medical board exams and Alwattar completed her college degree. 
Due to their largely separate lives, the parties did not acquire any 
marital assets or debts."110 There being no assets of which the wife 
could have a claim in divorce, she instead sued to enforce the 
$25,000 deferred mahr. 111 
Both husbands and wives have sought to shield themselves 
using the law of premarital contracts. The UP AA, 112 which has been 
adopted in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, 113 creates 
special defenses against liability for premarital contracts. In 
addition to the ordinary requirements that a contract be voluntarily 
made and not be unconscionable, section 6 of the Act provides that a 
party who "was not provided fair and reasonable disclosure of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party'' and who "did not 
have ... an adequate knowledge" of those obligations may avoid 
liability under the contract. 114 Wives wishing to avoid having their 
claim to marital property limited to the value of their deferred mahr 
have relied on this provision, arguing that prior to signing the 
marriage contract their prospective husbands failed to disclose their 
assets. 115 Likewise, husbands wishing to avoid the obligation to pay 
the deferred mahr have insisted that they are relieved of any 
obligation under the marriage contract because their prospective 
wives failed to make the same disclosure. 116 
With a few exceptions, 117 most American courts faced with mahr 
110. ld. 
111. ld. ("Alwattar argued that the marriage contract constituted a valid 
and enforceable prenuptial agreement that entitled her to an award of 
$25,000."). 
112. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001). 
113. Jana Aune Deach, Case Comment, Premarital Settlements: Till Death 
Do Us Part-Defining the Enforceability of the Uniform Premarital Agreement 
Act in North Dakota, In Re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997), 74 N.D. 
L. REV. 411, 417 n.52 (1998). 
114. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2)(iHiii), 9C U.L.A. 48 
(2001). 
115. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) ("[The) antenuptial agreement was unenforceable 
under Ohio law because at the time the agreement was entered into, appellee 
was not represented by counsel, there was no disclosure of appellant's assets, 
and the agreement did not take into consideration the assets subsequently 
acquired in Ohio during the eight-year marriage."). 
116. See, e.g., Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1-2 (holding that a $25,000 
deferred mahr would not be enforced against the husband because "the parties 
entered the marriage contract under circumstances that rendered the contract 
invalid and unenforceable"). 
117. See, e.g., Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing a 
mahr contract under the New York General Obligations Law, which codifies the 
ordinary common law of contracts); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. 
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contracts have treated them as premarital agreements. 118 Generally 
speaking, judges have reached fairly sensible results in these cases. 
Husbands have not been particularly successful in using mahr 
contracts as an upper limit on their wives' claims to marital assets. 
In some of the cases this is because the husbands' legal arguments 
overreached. For example, in In re Marriage of Shaban, 119 a couple 
married in Egypt using a traditional contract ending with the words: 
"The above legal marriage has been concluded in Accordance with 
his Almighty God's Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet to whom 
all God's prayers and blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance 
from the two contracting parties."120 
The husband argued that with this language the parties had 
imported the whole of the Islamic law of marriage and divorce into 
their agreement. 121 The court dismissed this argument on parol 
evidence and statute of frauds grounds. 122 Husbands making the 
more modest claim that their wives had bargained away their rights 
to equitable distribution of marital property in return for the 
deferred mahr have been met with the holding that they failed to 
properly disclose their financial situation. 123 While wives seeking to 
enforce the mahr claim have been met on occasion with the same 
failure-to-disclose defense, 124 courts have generally been friendlier to 
their claims for the payment of the deferred dower. 125 
Treating mahr contracts as premarital agreements, however, 
creates a risk of perverse outcomes. In Chaudry v. Chaudry, 126 the 
New Jersey appellate court considered the divorce of a couple who 
had married many years before in Pakistan by executing a 
traditional marriage contract. 127 Pakistani family law follows the 
App. 2008) (rejecting the wife's claim that the mahr contract should be treated 
as a prenuptial agreement). 
118. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Shahan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 867-69 (Ct. 
App. 2001). 
119. 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001). 
120. Id. at 866. 
121. See id. at 866-67 ("Ahmad made an offer of proof that the phrase 
signified a written intention by the parties to have the property relations 
governed by 'Islamic law,' which provides that the earnings and accumulations 
of each party during a marriage remain that party's separate property."). 
122. See id. at 867-69. 
123. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *4-6 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) (rejecting husband's claim that the mahr 
provision barred a court from awarding equitable distribution of marital 
property to the wife). 
124. See, e.g., Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07-AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at 
*1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008). 
125. For cases enforcing mahr provisions against husbands, see S.I. v. 
D.P.I., No. CN04-09156, 2006 WL 2389260, at *3-4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 5, 2006); 
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); Aziz v. 
Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985). 
126. 388 A.2d 1000, 1002-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
127. Id. at 1003-04. 
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classical fiqh in providing no equitable distribution of property upon 
divorce. 128 The couple moved to America where they lived for many 
years. 129 The husband was a successful doctor and the wife was a 
homemaker. 130 During the course of the marriage, the couple 
acquired substantial property in New Jersey. 131 Upon their divorce, 
the husband invoked the mahr contract, arguing that he was 
entitled to exclusive control of the couple's property over and above 
the amount ofthe deferred mahr. 132 The New Jersey appellate court 
wrote: 
[W]e have concluded that the wife is not entitled to equitable 
distribution by reason of the antenuptial agreement [i.e., the 
mahr provision], which was negotiated on her behalf by her 
parents. It could have lawfully provided for giving her an 
interest in her husband's property, but it contained no such 
• • 133 prOVISIOn. 
Accordingly, the court concluded, she was entitled to a mere 
$1500 in the couple's divorce. 134 The husband walked away with the 
rest of the marital assets. 135 
Less dramatically but more frequently, the specialized law of 
premarital agreements provides parties with special defenses to 
liability not available under ordinary rules of contract law. 
Litigation over mahr agreements in Ohio illustrates the issue. In 
Gross v. Gross, 136 the Ohio Supreme Court considered the general 
enforceability of prenuptial agreements. The court sought a middle 
ground between the position that prenuptial agreements should be 
treated as ordinary contracts and the position that they should be 
128. See id. at 1006 ("The expert testimony establishes that alimony does 
not exist under Pakistan law and an antenuptial agreement providing therefor 
is void as a matter oflaw in that country."). 
129. Id. at 1004. 
130. ld. at 1002. 
131. See id. (finding the husband owned substantial assets in New Jersey 
and intended to remain domiciled there). 
132. See id. at 1006 ("It also makes it clear that the antenuptial agreement 
could [have] provided for the wife's having an interest in her husband's 
property, but no such provision was made; instead, it provided only for her 
receiving 15,000 rupees."). 
133. Id. 
134. ld. 
135. Id. While the court in Chaudry did conclude that the mahr contract 
was a premarital agreement in which the wife had bargained away any rights 
to equitable distribution of property, the court's decision also rested in part on 
choice of law grounds; although, as I discuss in a forthcoming article on mahr 
contracts, the court's conflicts analysis is ultimately confused and unpersuasive. 
Nathan B. Oman, How To Judge Shari'a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Mahr 
Agreements in American Courts, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 28-
30, on file with author). 
136. 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). 
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void as violating public policy. 137 It concluded: 
Upon our considered view and analysis of the very specialized 
purpose of these types of agreements, i.e., the disposition of 
property, and provision for support or sustenance alimony at 
the time that a divorce or separation might take place between 
the parties, we conclude that a strict application of the law of 
contracts would not be appropriate. 138 
Accordingly, the court concluded that in addition to the ordinary 
requirement that there be no duress or overreaching in contract 
formation, there must be "a full disclosure of the assets of the 
parties" and the contract must "not promote or encourage divorce."139 
This disclosure requirement-not present in the ordinary law of 
contracts-is essentially identical to that required under the 
UPAA.14o 
The so-called Gross requirements have been invoked by both 
husbands and wives litigating mahr provisions. In the case of 
Zawahiri v. Alwattar mentioned above, the husband was able to 
successfully invoke Gross to avoid liability to pay the mahr. 141 At 
trial, the wife had urged the court to enforce the contract as a 
premarital agreement, but the court held that "the parties entered 
the marriage contract under circumstances that rendered the 
contract invalid and unenforceable as a prenuptial agreement."142 
Likewise, in Ahmad v. Ahmad, also mentioned above, the wife 
invoked the same Gross disclosure requirements against her 
husband, who wished to have the mahr contract enforced as a 
relinquishment of her rights in divorce. 143 The court concluded that: 
[T]he sadaq or antenuptial agreement was unenforceable 
under Ohio law because at the time of the agreement was 
entered into, appellee was not represented by counsel, there 
was no disclosure of appellant's assets, and the agreement did 
not take into consideration the assets subsequently acquired in 
Ohio during the eight-year marriage. 144 
137. See id. at 505-06 (discussing the treatment of prenuptial agreements 
under previous Ohio cases and by courts in other states). 
138. ld. at 507-08. 
139. Id. at 510. 
140. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT§ 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001). 
141. Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07-AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *3-5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 10, 2008). 
142. Id. at *2. On appeal, the court upheld the trial court's decision on an 
abuse of discretion standard by suggesting that the husband may have failed to 
meaningfully consent to its terms because of overreaching by family and in-laws 
at the time of marriage. Id. at *6. This aspect of the court's opinion is 
discussed below. 
143. See Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 30, 2001). 
144. Id. 
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One might see the application of this doctrine to both husbands 
and wives as laudable evenhandedness by the Ohio courts. As 
discussed below, however, it more likely represents the more or less 
arbitrary invalidation of contracts in situations in which the absence 
of the required disclosure is unobjectionable. 
Ill. THE VIRTUES OF GENERAL CONTRACT LAW 
The law of premarital agreements is based on a social script 
about premarital bargaining. This script yields a set of assumptions 
about both the typical content of premarital agreements and the 
primary concerns presented by such agreements. AB a practical 
matter, most premarital agreements are designed to shield the 
assets and income of a wealthier spouse (generally, but not always, 
the husband) from the claims of a poorer spouse (generally, but not 
always, the wife) upon divorce. 145 Premarital agreement law is 
therefore geared around the assumption that a prospective spouse 
presented with a premarital contract is being asked to bargain away 
his or her rights to equitable distribution of marital property upon 
divorce. 146 This bargaining dynamic creates an awkward and 
dangerous situation. In negotiating the terms of the premarital 
contract, the interests of the parties are adverse. On the threshold 
of marriage, however, there are likely to be high levels of trust and 
optimism. The trust creates a temptation for the wealthier 
prospective spouse to take advantage of his or her poorer partner by 
getting him or her to sign away claims on future assets and income 
without providing full disclosure of the value of what is being lost. 147 
Likewise, the law fears that in the midst of prenuptial optimism 
men and women underestimate the likelihood of divorce and 
inconsiderately give up valuable rights that they erroneously believe 
they will never wish to exercise. 148 Given these concerns, 
invalidating premarital agreements in which parties fail to take the 
145. See Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 234-35, 294 (1994) (arguing that this premise of 
premarital agreements renders them hostile to women). 
146. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, at 103 ("Premarital agreements, also 
called antenuptial or prenuptial contracts, are most often utilized when 
prospective spouses wish to contractually vary, limit, or relinquish certain 
marital property and support rights that they would otherwise acquire by 
reason of their impending marriage."). 
147. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The 
Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 193 (1998) ("Premarital agreements are good 
examples of contracts that illustrate problems with rational judgment, as they 
involve long-term planning and the consideration of possible negative outcomes 
at a time when the parties are most likely to be optimistic that no such negative 
outcomes will occur."). 
148. See id. at 193-95 (discussing studies that show that even well-educated 
people are prone to overstating the probability that their marriage will not end 
in divorce). 
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prophylactic step of full disclosure of assets and liabilities makes 
149 
sense. 
When these assumptions are transposed to the context of 
Islamic marriage contracts, however, problems arise. Understood in 
their own terms, Islamic marriage contracts do not fit within these 
narratives. When the parties make these contracts, they do not 
intend to bargain away their rights under American divorce law. 150 
The requirement that a marriage contract contain a mahr predates 
the existence of the United States by centuries. Indeed, it predates 
the very existence of the common law by centuries. 151 Within the 
context of Islamic law, it does not make sense to say that a wife is 
bargaining away her claim on her husband's future assets or 
income. Islamic law gives her no such claim to bargain away. Given 
this social context, it is implausible to interpret these contracts as 
bargaining away such rights. To be sure, a man who gets married 
under shari'a law in Saudi Arabia may well expect that upon divorce 
his wife will have no claim on the wealth he has acquired during the 
course of the marriage. This expectation, however, does not arise as 
a matter of contract. Rather, it arises because of the background 
rules of Islamic property law. Such expectations will be 
disappointed in an American divorce proceeding after the couple 
moves to America. The disappointment, however, arises not because 
of a refusal to enforce the marriage contract but because American 
rather than Saudi Arabian property law governs the case. 
The presence of a specialized law of premarital agreements, 
however, encourages American courts to understand mahr contracts 
as analogous to ordinary prenuptial agreements. Accordingly, 
numerous courts have concluded that mahr contracts are intended 
to bargain away a wife's right to marital property upon divorce, even 
when those courts have successfully labored to find some reason for 
invalidating the contract so as to avoid this harsh result. 152 This 
149. But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 (arguing for the ineffectiveness of 
disclosure requirements in the subprime mortgage market); Omri Ben-Shahar 
& Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Univ. of Chi. Law 
Sch. Olin Law & Econ. Prog., Research Paper No. 516 & Univ. Mich. Law Sch., 
Law & Econ. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Paper No. 10-008, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567284 (arguing that 
mandated disclosure rules serve as poor prophylactics against misbehavior or 
poor decision making). 
150. See Blenkhorn, supra note 75, at 200 (noting mahr provision is used as 
protective mechanism for Muslim women). 
151. See id. at 191 (noting that Islamic family law has changed very little 
since the tenth century). 
152. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Shahan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 867--69 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding that the statute of frauds prevented the court from 
enforcing the mahr as a premarital agreement); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 
1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding that the mahr agreement in the 
case limited the wife's claim to the husband's assets to the specified $1500). 
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creates the risk of Chaudry-like outcomes in cases in which courts 
are unable to find some other reason to deny enforcement. This is a 
problem of interpretation that can be cured within the framework of 
premarital agreement law. Nothing in that law requires courts to 
interpret mahr provisions as bargaining away rights in divorce. 
Courts, however, must resist the temptation to assume that the 
contract before them falls within the implicit social script of 
premarital agreement law simply because that law can arguably be 
applied to it. Rather, they should strive to understand the contract 
within its actual social context and according to the intentions and 
expectations of the parties. There is nothing in the UP AA that 
prohibits them from doing this, but the courts' error is 
understandable given the script that the Act presents to them. 
Indeed, part of the purpose of having a specialized body of law, 
ironically, is to relieve courts of the need to devote so much energy 
to understanding the transaction in the parties' terms. Rather, we 
invest energy in understanding transactional forms and drafting 
specialized laws in part to spare courts from having to invest in 
understanding transactional forms at the level of adjudication. 
There are limits, however, on the drafters' ability to understand and 
foresee new or different transactional forms. 
Once they are properly understood, there is little reason, absent 
special circumstances, not to enforce mahr contracts as written. 
Doing so respects the intentions of the parties, and when the courts 
give effect to such religiously motivated bargains, they take citizens' 
religious convictions seriously in ways that do not undermine the 
separation of church and state or religious freedom. Furthermore, 
enforcing such contracts helps to limit the abuse of talaq by Muslim 
men. Indeed, the Islamic law of talaq assumes that a wife's 
enforceable claim to a deferred mahr will limit its abuse. 153 
American courts that have been asked to acknowledge the legal 
validity of talaq have refused to do so on equal protection grounds or 
under state conflicts law. 154 Regardless of its legal validity, however, 
talaq remains an important social institution in the lives of many 
Muslim men and women. When a husband performs talaq against 
his wife, she is no longer married in the eyes of Islamic law-and 
often in the eyes of the Islamic community-even if she remains 
married in the eyes of the state. 155 Accordingly, talaq can create 
most of the social and economic consequences of divorce without the 
153. Blenkhorn, supra note 75, at 201. 
154. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500-02 (Md. 2008) (holding 
that the recognition of talaq would violate the Maryland equal rights 
amendment); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1-3 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (holding that recognition oftalaq would violate wife's due 
process rights); Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding 
that recognition of talaq would be contrary to good morals and natural justice). 
155. See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 280-83. 
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formal protections provided by a secular divorce proceeding. To the 
extent that women and their families wish to use legally enforceable 
contracts as a way of protecting wives from the abusive use of talaq 
by their husbands, there seems little reason not to recognize such 
agreements. 
Not only are the implicit assumptions of premarital agreement 
law with regard to the substance of mahr contracts incorrect, the 
implicit assumptions about the areas of concern are also misplaced. 
The social script on which the UP AA is based assumes that there is 
necessarily something awkward about injecting the antagonistic 
norms of bargaining into the context of an impending marriage. The 
fear is that parties will inconsiderately bargain away their rights in 
these circumstances. 156 A key element of this script is the notion 
that bargaining and contract are foreign and unexpected in the 
context of marriage. Within Islam, however, marriage is a 
contract. 157 It is not possible for a pious Muslim to become married 
without making a formal contract. 158 Furthermore, because the 
existence of a mahr is necessary for a valid marriage contract but 
the amount of the mahr is left to the parties, negotiation over the 
size of the mahr is an integral part of the parties' social 
expectations. For a person operating within the Muslim context 
nothing could be more natural than premarital haggling over the 
size of the dower followed by the parties formally signing the 
contract. Such activities are as much a part of the social script of 
Muslim marriages as church bells, aisles, altars, and priests or 
ministers are for Christian marriages. 159 
Given that no one is surprised by the presence of premarital 
bargaining in the Muslim context, the cautionary rules that the 
UP AA suggests for prenuptial agreements are beside the point for 
mahr contracts. There is no special need to make the prospective 
wife aware of her potential husband's assets and income because she 
is not bargaining away her claims on these assets and income when 
she assents to the mahr provision. Nor do the disclosure 
requirements serve an important cautionary function. The parties 
156. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001) (noting 
the conditions under which a premarital agreement is not enforceable, 
including involuntarity, unconscionability, and nondisclosure of property or 
financial obligations). 
157. Blenkhorn, supra note 75, at 195. 
158. See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 272-73. 
159. There are, of course, cases where Muslims comply with the 
requirements of an Islamic marriage contract without necessarily 
understanding its historical meaning, just as there are many Catholics who get 
married without understanding the intricacies of canon law. See Blenkhorn, 
supra note 75, at 204 (noting that today some couples deem mahr only as 
symbolic religious practice). Nevertheless, just as canon law should serve as 
the starting point for understanding the social meaning of Catholic liturgy, the 
classical fiqh should be the starting place for understanding Muslim social 
practices. 
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expect to engage in contract negotiations. Certainly, a Muslim 
husband will have a difficult time plausibly claiming to have been 
surprised in some way by the notion that he would be asked to agree 
to some payment to his new wife upon divorce, given that the mahr 
is a necessary element of a valid marriage contract. Accordingly, in 
the Muslim context, the disclosure requirements serve as little more 
than a trap for the unwary-providing parties with technical 
excuses for avoiding liability ex post, even when the absence of 
disclosure ex ante provides no reason for supposing that the contract 
is suspect. 
Ironically, to the extent that bargaining over the mahr presents 
special concerns, the general law of contracts provides better tools 
for policing abuse than does the UPAA. Muslim marriages are 
frequently arranged through family members. In the case of 
unmarried women this social fact is formalized through the 
requirement of the wali. 160 Prospective husbands, however, will 
often be represented by their parents in negotiations over the 
marriage contract. 161 Hence, it is quite common for a couple to be 
presented with a contract on their wedding day that has been 
negotiated on their behalf by others. 162 Generally, both the wife's 
family and the husband's family have good incentives to represent 
the financial interests of their children. However, this will not 
always be the case, and when there is misfeasance by a wali or 
parent in negotiating a contract, the couple will be subject to strong 
pressure to sign the document on the wedding day. The UPAA's 
prophylactic disclosures, however, will do nothing to deter abuse in 
such situations. On the other hand, the common law doctrines of 
duress and undue influence are specifically designed to allow parties 
to escape their obligations under contracts entered into as a result of 
high-pressure tactics by intimates. 163 
The most likely situation involving questionable assent to a 
contract will involve pressure from family or in-laws, in particular 
pressure on the wife by her father or other male relative acting as a 
wali. 164 The pressure placed on a woman to consent to a marriage 
contract may range from physical abuse to economic and social 
160. NASIR, supra note 12, at 49-52. 
161. I d. at 50 (noting a father may conclude marriage on behalf of his minor 
sons). 
162. See Tamilla F. Ghodsi, Note, Tying a Slipknot: Temporary Marriages in 
Iran, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 645, 664 (1994). 
163. See, e.g., Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 759-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1978) (holding an agreement voidable in which the husband sought to induce 
his wife, who had a history of severe emotional disturbances, to sign a 
separation agreement on unfavorable terms). 
164. See Blenkhom, supra note 75, at 198 ("She may never conclude a 
marriage contract on her own in most Islamic legal systems; instead, she must 
defer to her wali to bargain for the terms of the contract and even to sign the 
finalized agreement."). 
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abandonment to social pressure not to disappoint familial 
expectations. 165 In order to make out a claim of duress, a wife would 
need to show that she entered into the contract because of an 
improper threat that left her with no reasonable alternative. 166 Any 
threat of physical violence would clearly satisfy the "improper 
threat" requirement and would likely leave the woman with no 
reasonable alternative in cases in which the threatened violence was 
immediate. 167 Likewise, threats of economic abandonment have 
been deemed sufficient to make out a case of duress. 168 It is 
unlikely, however, that mere social pressure will be sufficient to 
fd 169 support a case o uress. 
On the other hand, someone who enters a contract due to 
pressure from family members, especially a father acting as a wali, 
likely has a fairly strong claim for undue influence. 170 Undue 
influence is much more likely in cases in which family members use 
their influence to induce one another to sign contracts. 171 
Furthermore, when a father or other male relative acts as a wali his 
purpose is to look after the interests of the putative bride. 172 While 
not formally required by the fiqh, as a practical matter fathers or 
older male relatives routinely represent their sons in marriage 
negotiations in the same manner. 173 These agents are thus in a 
fiduciary-like relationship with their children. A fiduciary, of 
course, is a classic example of one who can easily exercise undue 
influence. 174 
If courts correctly interpret the meaning of mahr provisions and 
refuse to construe them as premarital agreements relinquishing the 
wife's claims under state divorce laws, it is very unlikely that during 
165. See id. at 198 ("In most communities, if a bride were to protest an 
arranged marriage, she would be viewed as highly disrespectful and would risk 
permanent ostracism from her family and community and may even risk 
death."). 
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175(1) (1981). 
167. See id. § 176(1)(a) (noting that a threat to engage in criminal or tortious 
behavior is improper). 
168. See, e.g., Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 121 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1938) 
(allowing the defense of duress when the coercion was directed against the 
plaintiffs step-father's future employment, the loss of which would have 
seriously affected his family). 
169. See, e.g., Mullins v. Oates, 179 P.3d 930, 937 (Alaska 2008) (defining 
duress as "requir[ing] a threat that arouses such a fear as to preclude a party 
from exercising free will and judgment"). 
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b (1981) ("The law 
of undue influence ... affords protection in situations where the rules on duress 
and misrepresentation give no relief."). 
171. See, e.g., Agner v. Boum, 161 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1968) (finding undue 
influence in a contract with elderly relative). 
172. See NASIR, supra note 12, at 49-52 (describing the role of the guardian). 
173. See id. at 50. 
174. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 824, 829 
(D.N.J. 1980) (discussing a fiduciary's responsibilities). 
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litigation a wife will wish to challenge the validity of the mahr 
contract. Nevertheless, should she wish to do so, the laws of duress 
and especially undue influence are available to protect her from 
overreaching. Likewise, a husband who was railroaded into signing 
an agreement through the high-pressure tactics of family and in-
laws can object to such tactics using standard contract defenses. 
Indeed, on appeal in the Zawahiri case discussed above, the 
husband was successful in making precisely such an argument. 175 
There is nothing about the law of premarital agreements that 
forecloses the application of such doctrines. It is striking, however, 
that the supposedly nuanced and context-sensitive law of premarital 
agreements provides no doctrinal tools for policing the sorts of abuse 
that are likely to arise in mahr contracts. The usefulness of the 
specialized rules is limited by the understandable failure of the 
drafters of the UP AA to foresee the issues presented by mahr 
contracts. On the other hand, the policing doctrines provided by the 
general law of contracts prove more serviceable precisely because 
their agnosticism toward transactional structure make them less 
tied to a particular account of contractual problems. 
CONCLUSION 
Context is important in contract law. Islamic marriage 
contracts vividly illustrate the importance of understanding the 
context not only of the parties' agreement but also of the concepts 
that they incorporate into their agreements. In Chaudry v. 
Chaudry, the court wrongly assumed that when a Muslim couple-
or more often their families-negotiates over the deferred mahr to 
be included in the marriage contract they are negotiating over the 
wife's rights under American divorce statutes. Once the religious 
context of Islamic marriage contracts is understood, the absurdity of 
this interpretive claim is apparent. Of course, the common law of 
contracts has never denied that in interpreting the meaning and 
intentions of the parties we must consider the context in which the 
contract is made. This is a simple point, but one that is worth 
175. The court wrote: 
No one disputes that the marriage contract, and specifically the mahr 
provision, was not discussed until the day of the wedding ceremony. 
According to Zawahiri, the imam raised the issue of the mahr only two 
hours before the ceremony was scheduled to begin. At that point, 
family and guests had already arrived. After a hurried negotiation, 
Zawahiri agreed to a "postponed" mahr of $25,000 because he was 
embarrassed and stressed. Moreover, Zawahiri did not have the 
opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to signing the marriage 
contract. Given · these facts, we conclude that the evidence 
demonstrates that Zawahiri entered into the marriage contract as a 
result of overreaching or coercion. 
Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07-AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 10, 2008). 
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remembering, if only because it can be forgotten by courts. 
Context, however, also presents a deeper problem. The desire 
for a law that pays closer attention to the specifics of different kinds 
of transactions has spawned numerous bodies of law that apply to 
particular classes of contracts. Embedded in all of these rules is a 
narrative about how particular transactions work and the particular 
challenges that they create. When reality diverges from this 
implicit script, the very specificity of particularized contract law can 
become a problem. First, the entrenchment of the law's implicit 
script in the minds of judges can encourage them to ignore 
conflicting context because the law encourages them to think they 
understand what is "really" happening in such contracts. Second, 
shorn of their connection to the reality of the transaction, the 
specialized rules can become traps and technicalities. 
The law of premarital obligations assumes a particular cultural 
script about marriage, a script in which contract is an awkward 
intruder at the wedding feast. The law assumes that what parties 
will normally be doing in premarital agreements is bargaining away 
valuable rights upon divorce. Accordingly, it creates special 
defenses to protect parties from their own ill-considered decisions. 
In contrast, within Islam, far from being a foreign element at the 
wedding, contract is at the heart of what it means to get married. 
One does not get married by walking down the aisle to be 
pronounced husband and wife by some priestly authority or a 
modern stand-in in the form of a state official. Rather, one marries 
by signing a contract. Likewise, the mahr provision, rather than 
bargaining away preexisting rights in divorce, is designed in large 
part to constrain talaq, a very specific Muslim practice that has no 
clear analog in American law. Indeed, the very idea of divorce as a 
single unitary legal concept does not exist in Islamic law. Rather, 
there are only the specific forms of tafriq, khul', and talaq. Given 
the very different cultural script involved in Muslim marriages, it is 
little wonder that the law of premarital agreements is an awkward 
fit at best. 
Strikingly, however, the much-maligned generality of the 
common law of contracts performs quite well in the context of 
Islamic marriage contract. It provides resources in the doctrine of 
undue influence to police the most likely kind of overreaching in the 
context of mahr negotiations. Furthermore, by focusing the court's 
attention on the actual intentions of the parties and the meaning of 
their contractual actions in social context, it allows the mahr to 
function as it was intended without creating potentially perverse 
outcomes. In contrast, the law of premarital obligations focuses the 
court's attention on a social script that has limited relevance in the 
context of Islamic marriage contracts. 
